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How does Institutional Setting Affect the Impact 
of EU Structural Funds on Economic Cohesion? 
 ew Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe 
Abstract  
Structural Funds are the main instrument of the EU cohesion policy. Their effective use is 
subject to an ongoing debate in political and scientific circles. European fiscal assistance 
under this heading should promote economic and social cohesion in the member states 
of the European Union. Recently, the domestic institutional capacity to absorb, to dis 
tribute and to invest Structural Funds effectively has become a crucial determinant of 
the cohesion process and has attracted attention of the scientific community. The aim of 
this study is to shed light on the effectiveness of Structural Funds in the countries of the 
first Central and Eastern European enlargement round in 2004. Using regional data for 
these countries, we have a look on the impact of several institutional governance vari 
ables on the effectiveness of Structural Funds. In the interpretation of results, reference is 
made to regional economics. Results of the empirical analysis indicate an influence of 
certain institutional variables on the effectiveness of Structural Funds in the new member 
states. 
Keywords:  EU cohesion policy, Structural Funds, institutional setting, 
    EU new member states 
JEL Classification: R11, P2, O38  
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Wie beeinflusst das institutionelle Umfeld 
die Effektivität der EU Strukturfonds im Hinblick 
auf die wirtschaftliche Kohäsion? 
 eue Ergebnisse für Mittel  und Osteuropa 
Zusammenfassung 
Europäische  Strukturfonds  sind  das  wichtigste  Instrument  der  EU Kohäsionspolitik. 
Ihre effektive Nutzung wird seit längerem in den politischen und wissenschaftlichen 
Kreisen diskutiert. Die europäischen Strukturfonds sind auf die wirtschaftliche und so 
ziale  Kohäsion  ausgerichtet.  Sie  sollen  dazu  beitragen,  wirtschaftliche  und  soziale 
Probleme zu lösen und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in den Mitgliedstaaten der Euro 
päischen Union (EU) zu fördern. Insbesondere die inländischen institutionellen Kapa 
zitäten, die europäischen Finanztransfers zu absorbieren, zu verbreiten und effektiv zu 
investieren, werden zunehmend zu einem entscheidenden Faktor für effektive Kohä 
sionsprozesse, was wir in unserem Beitrag auf den Prüfstand stellen. Ziel ist dabei, die 
Effektivität der Strukturfonds in den Ländern der ersten EU Erweiterung um mittel  und 
osteuropäische Länder im Jahr 2004 zu analysieren. Anhand dieser Länder werden die 
Effekte verschiedener institutioneller Variablen auf die Wirksamkeit der Strukturfonds 
auf regionaler Ebene untersucht. In der Interpretation unserer Ergebnisse beziehen wir 
uns zusätzlich auf die Regionalökonomie. Das Ergebnis der empirischen Analyse zeigt 
den Einfluss bestimmter institutioneller Variablen auf die Effektivität der Strukturfonds 
in den neuen Mitgliedstaaten der EU. 
Schlagwörter: EU Kohäsionspolitik, Strukturfonds, Institutionen, 
    Neue EU Mitgliedsländer  
JEL Klassifikation: R11, P2, O38 
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1.  Introduction 
Structural Funds are the main instrument of the EU Cohesion Policy. They should serve 
to achieve economic and social cohesion by reducing differences in economic develop 
ment between the EU regions. Member States of the European Union (EU) receive as 
sistance from the EU Structural Funds to tackle structural economic and social problems 
and to promote development. Several funds are used to this end among which the Euro 
pean Regional Development Fund (ERDF) is the largest. This fund was introduced in 
1975. Since then economic and social cohesion are overarching objectives of the Euro 
pean Community, although the regulations and the scope of EU Cohesion Policy have 
undergone many changes.  
Recent developments of the European Cohesion Policy enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty, 
with the focus on growth, competitiveness and three dimensions of cohesion – eco 
nomic, social  and territorial cohesion –,  are directed towards strengthening of EU’s 
global economic and political role. The distinctive European Model of Society should 
be based on solidarity and co operative governance. New strategic documents included 
within “Europe 2020” as the framework for Cohesion Policy in the post 2013 period 
outline the challenges facing the European Union as a whole and its individual Member 
States. The high relevance of the European Cohesion Policy is evident in this context as 
Structural Funds absorb approximately 1/3 of EU budget. Hence, the EU’s fiscal trans 
fers require public legitimation. Recently the spending under the auspices of the Struc 
tural Funds Programs is subject to ex post evaluations and political discussions for the 
new funding period 2014 2020.  
Despite the ongoing debate on the new policy implications the main principles of the 
EU Cohesion Policy, however, remained unchanged. First, the largest part of the overall 
Structural Funds budget goes to regions with Convergence Objective (formerly Objec 
tive 1) status. 2/3 of the total budget is distributed among regions with GDP per capita 
less than 75% of the EU average to foster growth of per capita GDP and to promote ag 
gregate growth in the EU (Becker, Egger, and Ehrlich 2010). Second, to receive support 
from the EU the member state are obligated to co finance regional projects and pay 
ments are granted on specific conditions. This implies that the domestic institutional ca 
pacity to absorb, to distribute and to invest EU grants effectively has become a crucial 
determinant of cohesion process and has attracted attention of the scientific community.  
The recent literature focuses on the evaluation of the effectiveness of Structural Funds 
in achieving cohesion between the member states or the regions. In general, Structural 
Funds expenditures are assumed to be effective if they promote growth and foster a 
trend to convergence across regions or countries. Empirical evidence for convergence 
between European nations or regions as well as the evidence for the effectiveness of 
Structural Funds in the literature is however mixed. Some recent studies find neither 
convergence of regional per capita income (Boldrin and Canova (2001) for 185 NUTS2  
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regions in the period 1980 1996) nor signs of increasing growth rates in the most disad 
vantaged regions. Thus, they reject beneficial effects of Structural Funds. Other studies 
observe convergence on the national level and a positive relationship between Structural 
Funds and GDP growth (Beugelsdijk and Eijfinger (2005) for 15 EU member states in 
the period from 1995 2001). 
These obviously contrary observations directed attention to the country specific envi 
ronment and especially to institutional factors that probably influence the effectiveness 
of Structural Funds. Hence, in some recent studies next to ‘traditional’ economic varia 
bles also measures for institutional quality were considered; such as corruption, effi 
ciency of bureaucracy, competitiveness of political participation, political and admin 
istrative decentralization. Furthermore, variables like the degree of trade openness, in 
flation,  macroeconomic  stability  were  introduced  as  proxies  of  institutional  quality. 
Since then, the impact of the EU Structural Funds on the growth rate (and related varia 
bles) of 15 EU member states and the interaction terms with institutional variables be 
came significant (Katsaitis and Doulos 2009, Ederveen et al. 2002; Ederveen, de Groot, 
and Nahius 2006).  
However, the positive effect of high institutional quality does not automatically impli 
cate that cross territorial differences in economic and social development are reduced as 
aimed  by  the  EU  Cohesion  Policy.  It  is  still  questionable  whether  the  EU’s  fiscal 
equalization transfers are investment stimulating and foster the convergence process. A 
number of recent studies have shown that the effectiveness evaluation is ambiguous for 
the following reasons. First, the requirement of co funding ensures, on the one hand, 
that resources are invested. On the other hand, they may cause crowding out of national 
funds from otherwise implemented projects (Bähr 2008) and attract human capital from 
other more productive activities. Second, the institutional setup such as impact of de 
centralization is playing a crucial role. It could be expected that regional authorities 
have better information  on specific  growth enhancing projects. At the same time,  a 
higher degree of centralization inhibits a greater administrative capacity that ensures a 
more effective regional implementation of the programs (Ezcurra and Rodriguez Pose 
2011). In addition, Ederveen et al. (2006) point out another possible negative impact on 
growth of the decentralized decision making. Structural Funds payments may provide 
profitable options for rent seeking by public officials on national and regional level. 
Those administrative bodies are involved in partnership based decision making process 
to specify the National Strategic Programs, to define the specific project priorities and 
are particularly concerned with implementation of operational programs (Katsaitis and 
Doulos 2009). These activities allow public officials to channel financial transfers in 
such a way to pursue their own strategies and interests. 
To summarize, the impact of “non traditional” institutional variables on effectiveness of 
the EU Structural Funds is not to be neglected and therefore needs to be examined in 
more detail; even that is difficult if not impossible. In this paper, we use a unique set of 
“non traditional” institutional variables and try to establish further evidence for the con  
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nection between the institutional quality and the effectiveness of the Structural Funds in 
terms of convergence and cohesion. Earlier works evaluated EU Structural and Cohe 
sion policies for the old EU member states, implying the availability of sufficient data 
as regards the number of regions as well as the time dimension. Different from the 
studies mentioned before, we focus on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Since (but also before) these countries joined the European Union in 2004 they became 
eligible for transfer payments as poor regions regarding the EU average of GDP per 
capita. Lagging behind the EU 15 average in term of per capita income these countries 
are expected to have a high benefit from fiscal transfers and converge towards “rich” 
countries. Hence, the national institutional settings possibly support or reduce this posi 
tive net effect on GDP per capita. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of the theoretical 
framework  for  the  EU  Cohesion  Policy  and  offers  a  literature based  review  on  the 
existing studies. It considers the methodological approaches and discusses how these 
can be used in our study. Section 3 presents our empirical study design and is followed 
by section 4 with the econometric investigation. Section 5 concludes with a brief inter 
pretation of results and some implications for policy. 
2.  Theoretical Framework for Evaluation of the EU Cohesion 
Policy 
Empirical evaluation studies of the EU Cohesion Policy are mainly based on neoclas 
sical growth theory and trade theories and their reasoning is still dominated by the so 
called “convergence hypothesis”. This hypothesis implicates that under certain condi 
tions countries and regions converge in terms of income level and productivity. How 
ever, the necessity and the impact of Cohesion Policy interventions are considered as 
ambiguous. The theoretical approaches could be differentiated between “new” and “tra 
ditional” concepts with different political implications (Heinemann et al. 2010, p. 28 36; 
Hagen and Mohl 2009, p. 6 12; Monastiriotis 2011). New (endogenous) growth theory 
(Romer 1986, 1990) implies that long term positive effects are possible if the regional 
political interventions promote R&D, human, social and public capital. New economic 
geography indicates similar positive effects (Krugman 1991) under condition of a dy 
namic interplay between agglomeration and dispersion forces. Traditional neoclassical 
growth theory (Solow 1956) neglects long term effects of regional policy. According to 
the Solow one sector growth model   under assumption of common technology and di 
minishing returns   countries with similar economic conditions converge to the same 
balanced growth path (income level) if they have access to technological know how. 
The  recent  evaluation  of  EU  Cohesion  Policy  in  econometric  studies  is  focused  on 
testing the convergence hypothesis. However, there are different concepts of conver 
gence. The so called ß convergence implies that less developed countries grow faster  
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than richer countries in terms of income level (measured in GDP pro capita, Durlauf, 
Johnson and Temple 2005, p. 585). If the relationship between income growth and the 
initial income level is inverse without controlling for other variables, ß convergence is 
unconditional or absolute. Conditional convergence assumes the same relationship after 
conditioning of further variables. Thus, the neoclassical growth model expects negative 
ß. Both hypotheses are approved by empirical studies (Hagen and Mohl 2009, p. 8; 
Heinemann et al. 2010, p. 32). Hence, the ß convergence concept   with its linear re 
gression context of the neoclassical  growth model   is widely used for econometric 
evaluations  of  cohesion policy.  The  second  convergence  concept  –  σ convergence    
measures  the  diminishing  of  income  dispersion  over  time  (Barro  and  Sala i Martin 
1991, 1992). Both concepts are linked whereas σ convergence presumes the evidence of 
ß convergence but not the other way round. In other words, the income levels can dis 
perse between regions (e.g. no σ convergence) while less developed regions still grow 
faster than developed ones (e.g. ß convergence). Independent from the concept of con 
vergence  applied  the  impact  of  EU  Structural  Funds  on  regional  development  and 
growth within CEE countries might be different from that in the 15 EU member states.1 
As all EU new member states had similarly low levels of per capita initial income be 
fore the EU accession, higher growth rates and faster convergence processes can be ex 
pected. That makes them an interesting subject for a separate evaluation. 
In our econometric study we refer to a range of empirical studies that have been con 
ducted in order to evaluate the effects of EU Structural Funds. As an example for a re 
cent literature review, Heinemann et al. (2010, p. 89) give an overview of 15 studies. 
The majority of these studies is looking for effects on the level of NUTS2 and NUTS1 
regions. Results are diverse, as the studies are based on different methods, data sources 
and research questions. Some of the recent studies find neither convergence of regional 
per capita incomes (Boldrin and Canova (2001) for 185 NUTS2 regions in the period 
1980 1996) nor signs of increasing  growth rates in the most disadvantaged regions. 
Thus, they reject beneficial effects of Structural Funds. Other studies observe ß conver 
gence among 15 EU member states and a positive relationship between Structural Funds 
and GDP growth on the national level (Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger 2005). 
The usual setup of these studies is described by Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005). It is 
based on neoclassical growth theory and empirical tests are then specified using the 
concept of ß convergence. In most cases the variables considered comprise the initial 
(per capita) level of GDP, population (growth), human capital (growth), investment or 
savings quota. We include this data selection also in our study as far as data is available 
                                                 
1  Beside  ß   and  σ convergence  recently  some  scholars  have  found  evidence  in  favor  of  club 
convergence  for  within country  clubs  (Fischer  and  Stirböck  2006)  and  for  cross country  clubs 
(Artelaris et al. 2010). Accordingly to this concept smaller and less developed countries and regions 
converge to a different steady state than larger and advanced ones. The later follow a more dynamic 
path  of  growth  as  economic  preconditions  –  initial  level  of  income,  productivity,  institutional 
capacities – are different. The pattern of divergence has also been empirically confirmed for CEECs 
since the collapse of centrally planned system (Monastitiotis 2011, p. 6 8).  
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and relevant. By this means, a growth equation can be set up and the next step is to test 
effects of cohesion policy. Most studies so far apply panel estimations but there are also 
some cross section OLS studies. Effects comprise the speed of income convergence (the 
majority of studies) or other variables like FDI (Katsaitis and Doulos 2009). More spe 
cifically,  a  number  of  theoretical  arguments  can  be  tested  like  the  effectiveness  of 
Structural Funds conditional on the level of income convergence (Eggert et al. 2007), 
the geographic location (de Freitas et al. 2003) and others.  
As mentioned above, the findings of empirical studies are diverse. These different ob 
servations directed the attention to the country specific environment and especially to 
institutional factors that possibly influence the effectiveness of Structural Funds. Using 
country level  data  some  recent  studies  investigate  whether  the  impact  of  Structural 
Funds payments depends on institutional settings of the country (Ederveen et al 2006; 
Bähr 2008). In addition to “traditional” economic variables the measures and proxies for 
institutional quality are introduced, such as corruption indices, efficiency of bureauc 
racy, competitiveness of political participation, political and administrative decentrali 
zation, degree of trade openness, inflation, and macroeconomic stability.  
An important result of a number of empirical studies is that the impact of Structural 
Funds on growth and the interaction terms with institutional variables show significant 
values. For instance, Ederveen et al. (2006) find evidence for effects of corruption, a 
good governance index (with the World Bank governance indicators “political stabil 
ity”, “government effectiveness” and “rule of law” defined by Jeffrey Sachs) and other 
proxies for the institutional setting on the growth enhancing effect of Structural Funds. 
In a similar study, Bähr (2008) could find evidence for a conditioning effect of tax 
autonomy in this context. Katsaitis and Doulos (2009) tested a measure for corruption 
and the Sachs index in their study about the effects of Structural Funds on FDI. They 
could find a conditioning effect of institutional variables on FDI. According to them, 
more corrupt countries especially in Southern Europe are prone to ineffective use of 
Structural Funds. This result is however not uncontested. For example, Beugelsdijk and 
Eijffinger (2005) could not find it between different country groupings with respect to 
growth.  
Our study relates to this recent strand of literature using similar model specifications. In 
contrast to many earlier studies we use regional data for our analysis instead of country 
level data. We justify our choice with the original focus of the EU Cohesion Policy on 
development and convergence of regions. Besides, we seek to increase the robustness of 
results by including a higher number of cross sections.    
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3.  Empirical analysis 
As mentioned above, our own empirical analysis is restricted to CEE countries, as ef 
fects of Structural Funds on economic cohesion in the post transition area of the EU are 
under researched, so far. The aim of our study is threefold. Our first aim is to shed light 
on the effectiveness of Structural Funds in the countries of the first CEEC enlargement 
round in 2004. To our best knowledge, the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy in this area 
was not yet tested, so far. Second, we have a look on the impact of several institutional 
governance variables like a corruption index and the accordance of NUTS2 regions with 
regional administration units (Heimpold 2008) on the effectiveness of Structural Funds 
at the regional level (NUTS2 regions). To this end, we estimate a specification where 
we let the institutional variable and Structural Funds interact to find evidence whether 
there is a conditional impact of Structural Funds received on regional disparities in the 
CEECs. Third, in the interpretation of our results we also make reference to regional 
economics. As an example, Heimpold (2008) has studied national strategic documents 
and  found  some  evidence  for  differences  in  the  conduct  of  EU  Cohesion  Policy  in 
CEECs with respect to the strategy of regional policy (equalization objective versus 
growth orientation objective). If this is confirmed in our additional calculation of cor 
relations, it is interesting for the judgment of Structural Funds in the context of the tar 
gets of EU Cohesion Policy.  
As a measure of Structural Funds we used financial flows under the ERDF headline of 
Objective 1 which are supplied by the DG Regio of the European Commission. There 
were 39 NUTS2 regions in the CEECs which received Objective 1 funding during the 
2000 2006  program  period.  Furthermore,  we  collected  economic  control  variables 
which are usual in our context of growth regressions and which are supplied by Eurostat 
at the NUTS2 level. We followed the specification and data transformation strategy of 
Ederveen et al. (2006) who have applied a neoclassical growth theory model of Mankiw 
et al. (1992). Our time frame covers the 2000 2006 program period, starting in 1999 and 
ending in 2007 just before the onset of the global financial crisis. This period was then 
divided in two sub periods of equal length (4 years each: 1999 2003; 2003 2007) which 
together approximately cover one business cycle (peaks were in 2000 and 2008). This 
step is justified by the consideration that a longer stretch of two periods takes a better 
account of income level versus growth effects. Besides, most studies mentioned in sec 
tion 2 are based on periods of similar length (usually 5 year spans are used). 
Our measure for initial GDP is the log of GDP per capita in 1999 (and 2003 for the sec 
ond sub period) given as purchasing power standard figure. The dependent variable is 
the difference of this variable measured at the end and the beginning of the sub period. 
This seems reasonable as investments induced by Structural Funds can be expected to 
need some time to unfold its productive potential. The other control variables are chosen 
similarly as in the Ederveen et al. (2006) study. We used the log of investment share and 
population growth (augmented by an assumed depreciation parameter of 0.05) over the  
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sub periods, a human capital variable2 and the flow of Structural Funds. The basic re 
gression equation takes the following form: 
gt = c + Yt 1 + It + HCt + nt + SFt + SFt * Instt + Instt 
The variables are defined as follows: gt as growth of per capita income in period t, Yt 1 
as log of per capita income of the subsequent period, It as log of the investment rate, 
HCt as growth of human capital, nt as log of the sum of population growth and the as 
sumed depreciation rate of 0.05, SFt as flow of Structural Funds (calculated as a share of 
regional GDP in the sub period) and Instt as the respective institutional variable. The in 
stitutional variables were further normalized to 0 in the first sub period as they were 
only introduced to control for a conditioning effect on the impact of Structural Funds in 
the second sub period and their joint influence should therefore be restricted to this pe 
riod only. 
Our selection of institutional variables comprised the corruption perception index (CPI) 
of Transparency International which was already used in earlier studies (Ederveen et al. 
2006, Eijffinger 2005). This variable was calculated as an average CPI figure of the 
years 2003 2006. Moreover, we constructed two institutional variables which were in 
spired by Heimpold’s (2008) work about the conduct of Cohesion Policy in Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. The first variable REG has value 1 in the case of ac 
cordance of a NUTS2 region with a regional administration unit in the CEECs. This is 
not always the case as in some cases the regional administration units (counties) of new 
member states were too small by EU standards and it was required by the EU to set up 
new NUTS2  administration  units  which  are just  responsible  for  the  management  of 
Structural Funds. In these cases the variable REG assumes value 0. Furthermore, Heim 
pold (2008) has studied strategic documents which are relevant for the conduct of the 
EU Cohesion Policy in some CEECs, i.e. Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. For the 
Czech Republic and Hungary he could find a stronger equalization objective (thus fa 
vouring regions with a laggard income position) while for Poland the picture was more 
in favour of the growth objective (favouring regions with a higher potential for growth). 
Such national strategies might be relevant for the effects of Structural Funds in the lar 
ger CEECs – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – which are comprised of 
a number of NUTS2 regions. In order to test if the strategies indeed played a role in 
each of these countries we conducted a correlation analysis of the initial regional per 
capita income positions and the per capita use of Structural Funds (the same variables 
were used in the regressions). Results are shown in Table 1. 
   
                                                 
2   Eurostat HRSTC data, change of employees (as a share in total employment) with an education in 
science and technology which are actually employed in that field.  
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Table 1:  
Correlations for the use of Structural Funds and regional income, */**/***: correlations 
significant at the 10/5/1% level 
   Correlations  n 
CZ  −0.97***  8 
CZ without Prague  −0.67*  7 
HU  −0.85**  7 
HU without Budapest  −0.86**  6 
PL  −0.37  16 
PL without Warsaw  −0.26  15 
SK  −0.85  4 
SK without Bratislava  −0.45  3 
What can be seen from Table 1 is that the equalization objective indeed played a role in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary even if their capital regions are removed from the 
sample. For Poland we can confirm Heimpold’s (2008) finding that the equalization 
objective is not dominant. The same holds for Slovakia with the reservation that there 
are only 3 observations without the capital region. Thus, we coded our equalization 
variable as 1 for the Czech Republic and Hungary and 0 for Poland and Slovakia. The 
countries with only one NUTS2 region were also coded as 0 because there was no scope 
for an equalization strategy relying on more than 1 region. 
Subsequently we performed panel regressions with our data set. The baseline estimation 
included our economic controls, however not the institutional terms of eq. (1).3 As the 
time dimension of our panel consisted of only two periods, no fixed effects or random 
effects could be applied. Therefore, a careful look on possible outliers and data anoma 
lies was especially important. Anomalies were detected using Students t influence sta 
tistics and included the capital regions of Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. That 
is however not surprising as these capitals are non representative for their countries 
which display a mono centric settlement structure (Heimpold 2008). Moreover, Lithua 
nia showed an extraordinary high growth in the first sub period (resulting in skewness 
of residuals) and was therefore removed from the sample. Finally, the Hungarian re 
gions displayed sluggish growth in the second sub period. This effect was captured by a 
country dummy for Hungary and this period. Estimation results for this basic specifi 
cation are shown in the first column of Table 2.4 The basic regression of Table 2 (1
st 
column) has a good fit and its results are in line with the basic hypothesis of neoclas 
sical growth models (see Mankiw et al. 1992). 
                                                 
3  Before starting our regressions we also checked if the use of Structural Funds was targeted to regions 
in severe economic difficulties in the countries considered. If this was the case, estimation results 
could display biased effects of Structural Funds (see Rodrik’s (2005) critique of policy evaluations 
which do not take into consideration possible policy endogeneity). Correlation coefficients between 
the  Structural  Funds  flows  (second  sub period)  and  the  GDP  growth  (first  sub period)  however 
proved to be small and insignificant. 
4  The underlying sample of 71 observations was used for the other regressions of Table 2 as well.  
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Table 2:  
Basic regression and conditional impact of institutions on the income effect of Struc 
tural Funds, */**/***: correlations significant at the 10/5/1% level, (Standard errors in 
parenthesis) 
      Institutional conditioning variables 
   Basic regression  Corruption index 
(CPI)  Regional administration  Equalization 
policy 
Log of initial GDP  −0.09***  −0.06*  −0.09***  −0.08** 
   (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Log of investment rate  0.17***  0.10**  0.19***  0.17*** 
   (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Change of human capital  0.09***  0.18***  0.09***  0.11*** 
   (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Log of (pop. growth+0.05)  −0.06***  −0.06**  −0.07***  −0.07*** 
   (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Structural funds  −4.59  −46.83**  −9.03  −7.42* 
   (3.87)  (19.74)  (6.42)  (4.18) 
Structural funds *  10.58**  3.76  −3.88 
institutional variable  (4.91)  (7.31)  (9.33) 
institutional variable  −0.04**  0.02  −0.05 
   (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Dummy for Hungary   −0.21***  −0.22***  −0.18***  −0.15*** 
(2
nd period)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
C  1.27***  1.06***  1.36***  1.19*** 
   (0.36)  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.34) 
     
Adjusted R squared  0.67  0.70  0.68  0.70 
Jarque Bera p value  0.43  0.26  0.32  0.45 
# of observations  71  71  71  71 
Three additional regressions which control for the conditioning impact of institutions on 
the income/growth effects of Structural Funds are documented to the right. Generally, 
the results of these regressions are comparable for the basic set of economic controls. 
The goodness of fit is slightly better for the regressions with institutional variables. 
Furthermore, only the interaction term of Structural Funds with the Corruption Percep 
tion Index shows a significant value, indicating that low corruption (high value of CPI) 
leads to higher growth/income effects of Structural Funds flows in the regions. The re 
gional administration variable does however not contribute to larger effects of Structural 
Funds,  as  the  insignificant  interaction  term  suggests.  Thus,  our  result  suggest  that 
Structural Funds have a similar impact regardless if their administration is conducted by 
an artificial layer imposed by the necessities of EU membership or not. The same also 
holds for the conditioning effect of an equalization strategy at the national level. We 
must however be careful in not misinterpreting this result as it does not mean that a na 
tional equalization strategy does not matter for the regional growth/income development  
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and the contribution of Structural Funds in this context. If there is a net effect of Struc 
tural Funds on regional growth/income, it might be that an equalization strategy impacts 
on regional development as it effects the distribution of Structural Funds among regions 
and thus the net growth effect which they experience. The conditioning effect of a low 
corruption record in our regressions suggests that there are such net effects of Structural 
Funds in the CEECs. Thus, our result for the equalization variable only indicates that 
there are no additional effects (positive or negative) for the working of Structural Funds 
which are implied by an equalisation strategy. This is an interesting result on its own 
because in the economic policy discussion equalization strategies are nowadays often 
seen as obstacles to growth – which we could not find in our study. 
4.  Conclusions and remarks for future research 
This study aims to add new insights to the evaluation of the EU Cohesion Policy and 
factors of its effectiveness in the last funding period 2000 2006. Its focus is on new EU 
member states of the 2004 enlargement round which are part of the CEE region. These 
countries had a per capita GDP lower than 75% of the EU’ average and, thus, their re 
gions qualified for Objective 1 transfers after accession to the EU. The analysis sheds 
light primarily on the impact of institutional variables on the effectiveness of the EU 
Structural Funds under the Objective 1 heading using regional level data (of NUTS2 re 
gions).  
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we provide estimates for drivers of per 
capita GDP growth over two sub periods in 10 countries of CEE. In additional regres 
sions we tested the additional effect of Objective 1 Structural Funds in the context of 
this growth regression. Second, three institutional variables – Corruption Perception In 
dex, a regional NUTS2 administration variable and an equalization/growth objective 
policy variable – were inserted into the regression together with Structural Funds. Of 
these institutional variables only the Corruption Perception Index signalled to have a 
conditioning effect on the impact of Structural Funds as the significant interaction term 
with Structural Funds indicated. This result corresponds with the intuitive assumption 
that a lower corruption leads to higher growth/income effect of publicly administered 
funds.  Third,  the  two  other  constructed  institutional  variables  that  were  inspired  by 
Heimpold’s (2008) work showed no significant value. This is an interesting finding in 
itself as these variables refer to the influence of national strategies on the conduct of the 
EU Cohesion Policy. 
If some tentative conclusions from our empirical findings can be drawn, these might be 
especially relevant for the countries following an equalisation strategy in their regional 
policy. Our results could be interpreted in such manner that equalization strategy is not 
counteracted by a low effectiveness of the EU Structural Funds transfers in promoting 
growth to the regions. Furthermore, our results indicate that a contribution of the EU 
Structural Funds to cohesion is not affected by the accordance of NUTS2 regions with  
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regional administration units. Thus, the division in NUTS2 regions does not reveal par 
ticular rent seeking activities and/or reduced administrative capacities caused by con 
flicts between regional administrations within one NUTS2 region. However, this might 
be also an aspect for further research considering the channels through which the EU 
Cohesion policy and national structural policy work. 
Nevertheless, empirical findings from regression analysis have generally to be inter 
preted with caution. For example Rodrik (2005) as well as Hagen and Mohl (2009) have 
raised the question of possible endogeneity of policy measures. This issue seems to have 
been neglected in most of the empirical studies. Moreover, Hagen and Mohl (2009) 
have pointed to the distinctive results of studies based on national data as opposed to re 
gional data. Spatial spillover effects can raise the problem of an omitted variable bias. 
One might expect an underestimation of the effects on the regional level as parts of pos 
sible beneficial effects of investment induced by Structural Funds could be realized in 
other regions. This, however, contrasts with findings that Structural Funds seem to show 
more visible effects on the regional level than on the national level (possibly also due to 
different tested convergence concepts, see Heinemann et al. 2010, p. 95). Other varia 
bles like political economic factors which are neglected in some of the empirical studies 
have been partly incorporated in our study as institutional variables (corruption, regional 
administration capacity, national strategies).  
Finally, we would like to mention some open questions for future research. First, we 
used for our analysis the framework of neoclassical growth theory with convergence 
hypothesis and aggregate data. Hence, our empirical results are in line with recent stud 
ies using the same method. However, it would be a challenging task to approach the 
evaluation of the  EU Cohesion Policy  with different theoretical and methodological 
tools. As example, instead of the concept ß convergence the effectiveness of EU’s fiscal 
transfers might be tested with the hypothesis of club convergence (Artelaris, Kallioras 
and Petrakos 2010). This would allow including the EU’s old and new member states 
into analysis to identify different convergence clubs within EU and its probable effects 
on the Structural Funds spending. Further, a more detailed analysis of economic out 
comes caused by EU’s financial assistance would require firm level data to identify the 
direct and causal effects. It would probably permit to examine the real net effect of EU 
Structural transfers on growth. Our recent analysis with highly aggregated data does not 
permit to distinguish between income level and growth effects clearly. Second, we focus 
on evaluation of the sign of the coefficient of Structural Funds but not of the size of its 
impact. Hagen and Mohl (2009) pointed at this question for the reason that “an expen 
sive EU regional policy with a tiny size effect might be effective but not “cost efficient" 
(Hagen and Mohl 2009, p. 9 10). Hence, the task to explore efficiency of EU Structural 
Funds in the new member states is important for a comprehensive evaluation of the EU 
Cohesion Policy. At the same time this is a challenging research question because of hardly 
precise measureable political economic factors that determine allocation of funds.   
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